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KENTUCKY, FETAL HOMICIDE, AND THE SUPREME
COURT'S PROBLEMATIC PERSONHOOD
JURISPRUDENCE
Mark A. Pembertont
I. INTRODUCTION
On March 15, 2001, Christopher Charles Morris negligently caused an
automobile accident which took the life of a pregnant woman and her unborn
child as the woman and her husband were traveling to a hospital for the child's
anticipated birth.' In the ensuing criminal prosecution, the Commonwealth of
Kentucky convicted Morris of a single count of vehicular manslaughter.2
Although the Commonwealth convicted Morris of vehicular manslaughter for
the death of the woman, prior Kentucky case law and United States Supreme
Court precedent prevented a conviction for the death of the unborn child. The
proceedings prompted the Commonwealth to adopt a new fetal homicide statute
and raised serious questions about the consistency of the United States Supreme
Court's personhood jurisprudence.4
Commonwealth ofKentucky v. Morris reached the Kentucky Supreme Court
on the question of whether the Commonwealth's existing homicide statute was
meant to address the killing of an unborn child.5 Because the statute did not
specifically mention fetal homicide, the primary issue was whether the statute's
definition of "human being" should include a viable unborn child.6 In its June
17, 2004, opinion, the court stated that homicide protection should apply to
unborn children at the point of viability and therefore overruled a 1983
decision, in which it had held the statute inapplicable to unborn children who
are not born alive.7  However, the court declined to convict Morris of
manslaughter for the death of the child because of the doctrine of expostfacto.8
t Symposium Editor, Liberty University Law Review, 2006-07; J.D. Candidate, May
2007, Liberty University School of Law; B.A. in Biology, 2004, Indiana University.
1. See Commonwealth v. Morris, 142 S.W.3d 654, 655 (Ky. 2004).
2. Id. at 663.
3. Id. at 654. Morris was also convicted of criminal assault for injuries to the husband. Id.
at 655.
4. See discussion infra Part III.
5. Morris, 142 S.W.3d at 654.
6. See Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 507.010 (1984); Morris, 142 S.W.3d at 654. Viability is the
point in the second trimester at which the fetus could potentially survive outside of the womb.
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 162-64 (1973).
7. Morris, 142 S.W.3d. at 660. See also Roe, 410 U.S. at 160 (defining "viability" as the
point in the second trimester at which the fetus can survive outside of the womb).
8. Morris, 142 S.W.3d. at 661 (stating that a court cannot apply a new statute
retrospectively).
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After oral argument, but before the court released its opinion, the Kentucky
General Assembly9 enacted a new statute, which explicitly authorized criminal
punishment for the killing of unborn children.' °
These important legal developments have demonstrated that the people of
Kentucky, through their representatives in the legislative and judicial branches
of government, believe that the killing of an unborn child requires the same
measure of punishment as the killing of an adult human being. However, in
light of the United States Supreme Court's federal abortion jurisprudence,
which clearly states that unborn children are not considered to be legal persons,
the Morris case and Kentucky's new fetal homicide statute are part of a
somewhat inconsistent scheme for the punishment of fetal homicide."
This Note discusses the development of Kentucky's fetal homicide
jurisprudence and how federal abortion law, as promulgated by the United
States Supreme Court, has stunted that development. Specifically, this Note
asserts that the Supreme Court's denial of personhood to unborn children in
Roe v. Wade has thwarted the punishment of those who kill unborn children
under existing homicide statutes and has slowed the creation of consistent and
effective statutes for the punishment of fetal homicide.12 Part II of this Note
describes the history of Kentucky's fetal homicide jurisprudence. Part III
analyzes the effects of the Supreme Court's abortion jurisprudence on both the
Morris case and the drafting of Kentucky's fetal homicide statute. Finally, Part
IV calls for a formal recognition of unborn personhood in order to bring
consistency to the law of fetal homicide.
II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF KENTUCKY'S FETAL HOMICIDE JURISPRUDENCE
A. Kentucky's Pre-Morris Approach to Fetal Homicide
The common law did not differentiate between the rights of an unborn child
and the rights of his mother.13 Therefore, the common law did not consider the
killing of an unborn child a homicide unless the child subsequently achieved at
9. Hereinafter referred to as the "General Assembly" or the "legislature."
10. Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 507A.040 (2004) ("A person is guilty of fetal homicide in the
third degree when he wantonly causes the death of an unborn child, including but not limited to
situations where the death results from the person's operation of a motor vehicle."). Had the
statute been in place at the time of the accident, the Commonwealth could have charged Morris
with third degree fetal homicide.
11. See discussion infra Part III.
12. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
13. Murphy S. Klasing, The Death of an Unborn Child: Jurisprudential Inconsistencies in
Wrongful Death, Criminal Homicide, and Abortion Cases, 22 PEPP. L. REv. 933, 934-35
(1995).
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least a moment of individual existence, apart from his mother, before his
death.' 4 Some common law jurists, such as Sir Edward Coke, supported the
born-alive standard because they believed that unborn children lacked the
capacity for personhood.' However, the born-alive standard actually
developed as an evidentiary rule, since historically the prosecution in a fetal
homicide case could not establish the necessary element of causation unless a
child was born alive.' 6 Without the benefits of more recent medical technology,
the prosecution could not prove that an unborn child had been alive at the time
of an alleged injury nor establish that a specific event had caused the child's
death. 17
14. Id.
15. SIR EDWARD COKE, THIRD INSTITUTE (1644) ("[I]f the childe be born alive, and dieth of
the Potion, battery, or other cause, this is murder: for in law it is accounted a reasonable
creature, in rerum natura, when it is born alive.").
16. Clark D. Forsythe, Homicide of the Unborn Child: The Born Alive Rule and Other
Legal Anachronisms, 21 VAL. U. L. REV. 563, 575 (1987) ("As a result of a primitive
understanding of human live in utero, the health of the child in utero could not be established
unless and until the child was observed outside the womb."); Annissa R. Obasi, Protecting Our
Vital Organs: The Case for Fetal Homicide Laws in Texas, 4 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 207,211
(1998) (stating that a lack of medical knowledge necessitated the born-alive standard); Clarke D.
Forsythe & Stephen B. Presser, Restoring Self-Government on Abortion: A Federalism
Amendment, 10 TEx. REV. L. & POL. 301, 309-10 (2006) (stating that the born-alive standard
was an evidentiary necessity). See also Commonwealth v. Morris, 142 S.W.3d 654, 655-57
(Ky. 2004) (explaining the origin of the common law born-alive standard). Before modem
medical technology existed, doctors could not know the health of the child until it was born.
As late as the nineteenth century, prior to quickening, it was virtually impossible
for either the woman, a midwife, or a physician to confidently know that the
woman was pregnant, or .... that the child in utero was alive. As a result, live
birth was required to prove that the unborn child was alive and that the material
acts were the proximate cause of death, because it could not otherwise be
established if the child was alive in the womb at the time of the material acts.
Id. at 657.
17. See Peter G. Guthrie, Proof ofLive Birth in Prosecution for Killing Newborn Children,
65 A.L.R.3d 413 (1975). The logic behind the born-alive standard was thus consistent with the
presumption of innocence absent proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. If the acquittal of a
guilty man is better than the conviction of an innocent one, then assuming that a miscarriage was
caused by something other than a defendant's action is preferable to assuming that the defendant
caused the death himself. The lower requirement of proof may also explain why tort law moved
away from the born-alive standard sooner than the criminal law. See also Dena M. Marks,
Person v. Potential: Judicial Struggles to Decide Claims A rising from the Death of an Embryo
or Fetus and Michigan's Struggle to Settle the Question, 37 AKRON L. REV. 41 (2004)
(discussing the development of fetal wrongful death statutes in various states).
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Many American states, including Kentucky, adopted the born-alive standard
from the common law, and some have continued using it to this day.18 In
1936, Kentucky affirmed its use of the common law born-alive standard by
ruling that a corpus delicti for infanticide could not exist unless the victim had
a "complete and separate existence of its own after birth."' 9 In the 1983 case of
Hollis v. Commonwealth ofKentucky, the Kentucky Supreme Court integrated
the born-alive standard with the Commonwealth's criminal code by explicitly
stating that a homicide conviction requires the birth of a live infant.20 The court
reasoned that an unborn child who never attained an existence independent
from its mother was not a human being, and since the homicide statute referred
only to the killing of human beings, it was inapplicable to unborn children.2'
With the advent of modem medicine, the born-alive rule is no longer
necessary as an evidentiary standard. The development of medical
technologies, such as pregnancy testing and ultrasound imaging, has allowed
doctors to confirm pregnancies soon after conception and to monitor the health
22of children in utero. By 2004, these technologies had obviated the evidentiary
necessity of the born-alive standard, and the Kentucky Supreme Court was
prepared to reevaluate its fetal homicide jurisprudence.23
18. See infra note 70.
19. Jackson v. Commonwealth, 96 S.W.2d 1014, 1014 (Ky. Ct. App. 1936).
20. Hollis v. Commonwealth, 652 S.W.2d 61, 62 (Ky. 1983), overruled by
Commonwealth v. Morris, 142 S.W.3d 654 (Ky. 2004).
21. Hollis, 652 S.W.2d at 62 (stating that a child must have a "complete and separate
existence" apart from his mother before becoming a "person" for the purpose of the homicide
statute (quoting Jackson, 96 S.W.2d at 1014)). See also Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 507 (1974);
Alan S. Wasserstrom, Annotation, Homicide Based on Killing of Unborn Child, 64 A.L.R.5th
671 (2005). Historically, the killing of an unborn child was not within the scope of a homicide
statute unless the child was born alive, subsequent to the act that led to his eventual death.
At common law and in the absence of statute, it is the rule that if a child dies
before birth, there is no crime, but if the child is born alive and thereafter dies
from the defendant's felonious act, the culpability is the same as that incurred in
the killing of any other human being. The essential element is the independent
existence of the infant.
Id.
22. See Morris, 142 S.W.3d at 660 ("Whether a fetus was viable when killed is just as
provable by competent evidence as whether a child was born alive or stillborn.").
23. Id. at 657; Klasing, supra note 13, at 956-57.
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B. The Morris Case
Commonwealth v. Morris marked a significant transition from the traditional
born-alive standard of personhood to a viability standard, and the opinion
illustrates the Kentucky Supreme Court's desire to authorize punishment for
fetal homicides.24 Although the ex post facto rule prevented the Kentucky
Supreme Court from convicting Morris of manslaughter for the death of the
unborn child, the court explicitly overruled its previous affirmation of the born-
alive standard, as articulated in Hollis v. Commonwealth, and stated that
Kentucky's homicide statute should apply to viable fetuses, even if they are not
born alive. 25 A review of the Morris case is helpful in understanding the issues
involved in Kentucky's fetal homicide jurisprudence as well as in
understanding the greater debate over unborn personhood.
At trial, Morris filed a motion to dismiss the charge of vehicular
manslaughter for the death of the unborn child. 6 He claimed that because the
child was not born alive, it was not protected as a human being under the Hollis
court's interpretation of Kentucky's homicide statute.27 The trial court refused
to dismiss the charge, and Morris entered a conditional guilty plea.28
24. Id. Technology now allows doctors to know whether a child could have survived if it
had been born before the injury. See id. These advances have allowed physicians to know the
causes of many pre-natal injuries with reasonable medical certainty. However, the viability
standard is necessarily flexible because the status of an unborn child's viability is left in a
physician's judgment. See Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 64 (1976). In the
same way that technology obviated the born-alive standard, it may also render the viability
standard insignificant. Id. As medical and technological advances continue to push back the
average point of viability, the current state of technology will be more important in determining
viability than an unborn child's level of physical development. See id. Assuming that no
newborn could survive outside the womb without at least minimal care, even the most basic
assumption of the viability test (that a definite point exists at which a newborn child could live
independently) seems flawed. Such a standard could also lead to problems of equal protection.
See infra discussion Part III. For example, a child treated at a state-of-the-art facility could
reach viability and therefore secure the protection of a homicide statute at an earlier stage than a
child treated at a hospital without access to the newest equipment and most highly trained
physicians.
25. Morris, 142 S.W.3d at 660. See also KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 507.010 (1984) ("A person
is guilty of criminal homicide when he causes the death of another human being under
circumstances which constitute murder, manslaughter in the first degree, manslaughter in the
second degree, or reckless homicide.").
26. Morris, 142 S.W.3d at 655.
27. Commonwealth v. Morris, No. 01-CR-00 114, slip op. at 3 (Ky. Ct. App. Sept. 13,
2002). See also KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 507.020(l)(b) (1984) (defining murder as "the operation
of a motor vehicle under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to human life" that
"thereby causes the death of another person."). For the purposes of this Note, the term "human
being" has the same meaning as the term "person," and the two are used interchangeably. The
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On appeal, Morris renewed his argument that the homicide statute did not
apply to unborn children.29 In response, the prosecution asserted that a
Kentucky abortion statute enacted after Hollis had rendered the born-alive
standard obsolete by explicitly defining a "human being" as "any member of
the species homo sapiens from fertilization until death., 30 The prosecution
claimed that according to this definition of "human being," the statute included
the killing of the unborn child, and that Morris was therefore guilty of
homicide.31 However, the Kentucky Court of Appeals reversed, ruling, inter
alia, that the 1984 federal district court case of Eubanks v. Brown had
invalidated the same abortion statute.32 In Eubanks, the district court ruled that
the statute unconstitutionally infringed upon the right to abortion by attempting
to promote a "definition of life as beginning at fertilization, a theory which the
Supreme Court has not adopted., 33
Kentucky Penal Code states that the word "person" "means a human being." KY. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 500.080 (2001). Kentucky's criminal homicide statute implies the same conclusion by
stating that "[a] person is guilty of criminal homicide when he causes the death of another
human being." KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507.010 (2004) (emphasis added).
28. Morris, No. 01-CR-00114, slip op. at 2.
29. Id. at 3.
30. Id. at 3; KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 311.720(6) (1982), declared unconstitutional by
Eubanks v. Brown, 604 F. Supp. 141 (W.D. Ky. 1984).
3 1. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507.010 (2004) ("A person is guilty of criminal homicide when
he causes the death of another human being under circumstances which constitute murder,
manslaughter in the first degree, manslaughter in the second degree, or reckless homicide.")
(emphasis added).
32. Commonwealth v. Morris, 142 S.W.3d 654,661 n.7 (Ky. 2004); Eubanks, 604 F. Supp.
at 144.
33. Id. at 144. Upon invalidating the Kentucky abortion statute the district court stated that:
Subsection 5 of Section 2 defines "fetus" as "a human being from fertilization
until birth," and Section 6 defines "human being" as "any member of the species
homo sapiens from fertilization until death." These two subsections are
unconstitutional because they incorporate into the law a definition of life as
beginning at fertilization, a theory which the Supreme Court has not adopted, and
which the Supreme Court has held may not be used by a state in a statute to justify
its regulation of abortion.
Id. See also Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 311.720(5) & (6) (1982); City of Akron v. Akron
Ctr. for Reprod. Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416,444 (1983); JoHN E. NowAK & RONALD
D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 866 (6th ed. 2000) ("In Roe v. Wade the Supreme
Court found that a woman's right to choose to have an abortion was a part of the
fundamental constitutional right to privacy.").
[Vol. 1:1
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The Kentucky Supreme Court then granted discretionary review to hear the
Commonwealth's argument that the "'born alive' rule [was] an anachronism
that should not be applied when the victim is a viable fetus., 34  The
Commonwealth also reasserted its claim that the General Assembly had
explicitly intended to extend attachment of the rights of personhood to the point
of conception through the broad definition of "human being" in the abortion
statute.35
The court began its analysis by noting that the born-alive standard was not an
evidentiary necessity in Morris because at the time of the accident, the victim
could have survived outside of the womb.36 The court then stated that
technological advancements had rendered the born-alive rule generally
inapplicable in that it would be unjust to retain a rule which was based on
outdated technology and limited knowledge.3 7 The court agreed that the born-
alive standard should be overruled in favor of the viability standard.38
However, the majority concluded that the "fair warning" requirement of the
Due Process Clause prohibited Morris's conviction under a standard that was
not in place at the time of his act.39
34. Morris, 142 S.W.3d at 655.
35. Id. See also §§ 311.720(5)-(6).
36. Morris, 142 S.W.3d at 655. The medical examiner stated that "the child was a viable
fetus who would have been born a healthy baby girl had she not sustained a fatal brain injury in
the collision.'" Id. The parties stipulated that the victim could have survived outside the womb
at the time of the accident. Id. at 655 n. 1.
37. See id. at 659.
38. Id. at 660. Although the Kentucky Supreme Court was generally receptive to the idea
that the born-alive standard should be discarded, it gave two reasons why the abortion statute's
definition of "human being" could not be used to interpret the homicide statute. First, the
Kentucky Constitution states that statutes may not apply to more than one subject. Id. at 661;
Ky. CONST. § 51. Therefore, the definition of "human being" in the abortion statute could not
apply ipsofacto to the Kentucky homicide statute. Morris, 142 S.W.3d at 660. Second, the
abortion statute was invalid on its face because it "violate[d] the directive in Roe v. Wade...
that a state may not adopt a particular theory of life for the purpose of overriding the rights of
the pregnant woman." Id. at 661 n.7 (quoting Eubanks, 604 F. Supp. at 144).
39. Morris, 142 S.W.3d at 663 (stating that new laws and new interpretations of existing
laws cannot be applied retrospectively). The Kentucky Supreme Court ruled that Morris could
not be found guilty of an action that was not illegal at the time he committed it, and thus
acquitted him for the death of the unborn child. Id. Although the court was obliged by the ex
post facto rule to uphold the born-alive standard in Morris, it stated that a more inclusive
standard was necessary. Id. at 661. The court then prospectively interpreted the Kentucky
homicide statute's definition of "person" to include unborn children after the point of viability.
Id. The court indicated that in Morris, because the victim was viable at the time of its death, it
did not need to address the merits of the conception standard and stated that "[p]resumably,
future homicides of nonviable fetuses will be prosecuted under [the fetal homicide statute]." Id.
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In one of two concurring opinions, Justice Keller agreed with the majority's
decision not to convict Morris for the death of the unborn child but took
exception to the majority's finding that medical advances had made the born-
alive standard obsolete. 40 He stated that the General Assembly's failure to
overrule the Hollis decision was evidence of legislative approval of the court's
interpretation of the homicide statute.41 Thus, he claimed that the court should
have followed the rule laid out in Hollis apart from any discussion of due
process.42 Justice Keller then asserted that because of a presumption against
redundant legislation, the adoption of the new fetal homicide statute proved that
the legislature had not intended the original homicide statute to include unborn
children within the term "human beings.
4 3
In a separate concurrence, Justice Wintersheimer agreed with the majority's
decision to overrule Hollis, stating that "it was long past due to remove that
holding from the jurisprudence of Kentucky." 44 He stated that medical
advances would continue to blur conceptions about fetal personhood and that
no legitimate difference exists between a viable unborn child and a slightly
younger unborn child, with less developed organs, who would not typically be
considered viable.45
Therefore, although the court made no comment on how the standard homicide statute should
treat the homicide of pre-viable unborn children, it appeared to approve of the fetal homicide
statute's use of the conception standard. Id. See also U.S. CONST. amend. V; U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV, § 1.
40. Morris, 142 S.W.3d at 664 (Keller, J., concurring).
41. Id. at 664-65 (Keller, J., concurring). The reenactment doctrine, "'a well-settled rule of
statutory construction,"' states that "'when a statute or clause, or provision thereof, has been
construed by the court of last resort of a state, and the statute has been substantially re-enacted,
the Legislature will be deemed to have adopted such construction."' Id. at 664 n.9 (quoting
Falender v. Hankins, 177 S.W.2d 382, 383 (Ky. 1944)) (Keller, J., concurring). Justice Keller
based his rationale on a disagreement "with the majority's prospective broadening of...
criminal homicide liability through its conclusion (a/Ida 'judicial fiat') that medical
advancements have changed the meaning of the word 'person'...." Id. at 663.
42. See id. at 664-65.
43. Morris, 142 S.W.3d at 665; Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 507A(2004); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 507 (1984). see also Kotila v. Commonwealth, 114 S.W.3d 226 (Ky. 2003).
44. Morris, 142 S.W.3d at 666 (Wintersheimer, J., concurring).
45. Id. at 666-67. ("Different technological improvements will move backward the point
of viability." (quoting Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, Inc., 462 US 416, 456 (1983)).
See also City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416,457 (1983) ("It is
certainly reasonable to believe that fetal viability in the first trimester of pregnancy may be
possible in the not too distant future."). In City ofAkron, Justice O'Conner went on to state that
the reduction of the pre-viable period is evidence that "[t]he Roe framework... is clearly on a
collision course with itself." Id. at 458. In Morris, Justice Wintersheimer noted the same
problem with the viability standard. Morris, 142 S.W.3d at 667 (Wintersheimer, J., concurring).
[Vol. 1: 1
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C. The Fetal Homicide Statute
On February 20, 2004, nine days after oral argument in the Morris case, the
Kentucky General Assembly enacted a fetal homicide statute which parallels
the standard homicide statute and authorizes punishment for the killing of
unborn children at any time after conception. 46 Because it applies even to the
earliest stages of pregnancy, the statute comes closer to establishing a
comprehensive framework for the punishment of fetal homicide than that
provided by either the live-birth or viability-based interpretations of the
standard homicide statute.47 If the General Assembly had been allowed to refer
to unborn children as persons, it would not have needed to establish the fetal
homicide statute-the standard homicide statute would have been sufficient.
The definitions section of the fetal homicide statute states that the term
"' [u]nborn child' means a member of the species homo sapiens in utero from
conception onward, without regard to age, health, or condition of
dependency. ' 48 This provision is analogous to the portion of the Kentucky
abortion statute (invalidated by Eubanks) that defined a "human being" as "any
member of the species homo sapiens from fertilization until death. ' 49 Although
both statutes implicitly acknowledge that personhood begins at conception, only
the latter explicitly contradicts the Supreme Court's personhood dictates by
referring to an unborn child before viability as a "human being.,
50
46. See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507A (2004). Because the statute was enacted subsequent
to the Morris cause of action, it was inapplicable to that case. As the Kentucky Supreme Court
explained, "The Ex Post Facto Clauses of both the United States and Kentucky Constitutions
preclude retrospective application of this statute to Appellee's conduct with respect to the
unborn child in this case." Morris, 142 S.W.3d at 661. However, in dicta, the court approved
of the increase in protection and took the opportunity to use Morris "as a vehicle to
prospectively adopt that definition via common law." Id. Because Morris broadened the scope
of the standard homicide statute to include protection for viable unborn children, the fetal
homicide statute essentially fills the gap between conception and viability, at which point the
homicide statute, as interpreted by Morris, takes effect.
47. See KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 507A.010 (2004); Commonwealth v. Morris, 142 S.W.3d
654 (Ky. 2004); Hollis v. Commonwealth, 652 S.W.2d 61 (Ky. 1983).
48. KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 507A.010 (2004).
49. Compare KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 311.720 (6) (1982), with KY. REv. STAT. ANN. §
507A.010(l)(c) (2004). The abortion statute's definition is broader in that it includes post-natal
human life while the fetal homicide statute refers only to human life in utero. However, this
distinction is not important to the discussion of unborn personhood.
50. Eubanks v. Brown, 604 F. Supp. 141, 144 (W.D. Ky. 1984) (stating that the abortion
statute's definition of "human being" was unconstitutional). All evidence indicates that the
legislature was attempting to duplicate the effect of abortion statute's invalidated definition
"human being" while avoiding unconstitutionality itself. The Commonwealth's assertion that
the definition of "human being" in the abortion statute should guide the interpretation of the
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According to Planned Parenthood v. Casey, a state may not impose any
"undue burden" on a woman who wishes to terminate her pregnancy before her
unborn child has reached viability.51 Because the imposition of criminal
liability would constitute a burden, the General Assembly could not draft a
statute imposing punishment on mothers who kill their pre-viable unborn
children. In an effort to retain an overall conception-based scheme of fetal
homicide, the legislature chose to exclude abortion from the statute's scope
rather than face inevitable invalidation by the Supreme Court.
52
The General Assembly avoided direct conflict with federal abortion
jurisprudence by drafting two important exceptions into the statute.53 This
decision assured the statute's constitutionality and helped to avoid potentially
homicide statute therefore gains considerable support. See generally KY. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 507A.01O0(c) (2004); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 311.720(6) (1982); Morris, 142 S.W.3d at 655.
51. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (affirming the right to abortion and
Roe's denial of unborn personhood). The '"right' to abortion 'protects the woman from unduly
burdensome interference with her freedom to decide whether to terminate her pregnancy."' Id.
at 874 (quoting Maher v. Roe, 432 US 464, 473-74 (1977)). "[The] undue burden standard is
the appropriate means of reconciling the State's interest with the woman's constitutionally
protected liberty." Casey, 505 U.S. at 876. "A finding of an undue burden is a shorthand for
the conclusion that a state regulation has the purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle
in the path of a woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus." Id. at 877.
52. KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 507A.010(3) (2004).
53. Id. at § 507A.010(2) (2004). The fetal homicide statute excludes physicians from
liability for the death of unborn children so long as the mother consents to the procedure and the
physician acts with reasonable skill. It states that:
(2)In a prosecution for the death of an unborn child, nothing in this chapter shall
apply to acts performed by or at the direction of a health care provider that cause
the death of an unborn child if those acts were committed:
(a) During any abortion for which the consent of the pregnant woman has been
obtained or for which the consent is implied by law in a medical emergency; or
(b) As part of or incident to diagnostic testing or therapeutic medical or fertility
treatment, provided that the acts were performed with that degree of care and skill
which an ordinarily careful, skilled, and prudent health care provider or a person
acting under the provider's direction would exercise under the same or similar
circumstances.
Id. Because the fetal homicide statute recognizes unborn personhood from conception onward,
the second provision was necessary to prevent physicians from being liable for the destruction
of embryos during fertilization procedures.
[Vol. 1: 1
HeinOnline -- 1 Liberty U. L. Rev. 182 2006
2006] PROBLEMATIC PERSONHOOD JURISPRUDENCE 183
crippling opposition from pro-abortion groups.5 4 The first exception prevents
prosecution of physicians for the homicides of unborn children during abortions
and fertility treatments." This exception is particularly important because
under a strict conception-based framework, a doctor would be guilty of a
homicide each time he negligently or intentionally destroyed an embryo or
fertilized egg during a fertility procedure.
5 6
The second exception was designed to prevent the prosecution of mothers
who obtain abortions and stated that none of the penalties relating to fetal
homicide "apply to any acts of a pregnant woman that cause the death of her
unborn child., 57 However, because it implicitly allows a woman to terminate
her pregnancy at any time and by any means, the exception is actually much
54. See Sandra L. Smith, Fetal Homicide: Woman or Fetus as Victim? A Survey of Current
State Approaches and Recommendations for Future State Application, 41 WM. & MARY L. REV.
1845, 1876-77 (2000). In an attempt to prevent a weakening of Roe, the ACLU has actively
pressured states attempting to enact fetal homicide statute.
The ACLU has been active in scrutinizing proposed fetal protection legislation.
This scrutinization has been to ensure that the proposals (1) do not infringe on a
woman's right to choose, (2) discourage the "policing" of pregnancy, and (3) do
not violate due process rights. To that end, they devised a list of six factors for
legislators and pro-choice activists to consider when drafting and evaluating such
legislation. First, the bill should define the woman alone as the victim, as opposed
to the fetus alone, or both the woman and the fetus. If the state does not include
such exceptions, then the proposal will probably be stiffly opposed by pro-choice
activists who might view it as a threat to abortion rights, as well as by groups
opposed to laws criminalizing maternal behavior during pregnancy. Second, in
order to diffuse pro-choice opposition, the bill should have an exemption for
abortions and the woman's conduct. Statutes that characterize the pregnant
woman as victim do not share the same problems because they penalize actions of
others against pregnant women, rather than the fetus and do not focus on the
potential actions of the pregnant woman. Third, the language used to describe the
fetus should not include anti-choice terms such as "pre-bom" or "unborn child."
Fourth, to comport with due process, the bill should require adequate knowledge
or intent to commit the crime. Fifth, the terms and prohibited conduct should be
defined precisely to avoid vagueness concerns. Sixth, the penalties for causing
fetal death should not be as severe as for killing a live person. Aligning proposed
legislation with these factors can help avoid conflicts with pro-choice advocates.
Id. Such efforts to constrict potential fetal homicide statutes by those who hope to protect the
right to abortion is clear evidence of the tension between the Supreme Court's abortion
jurisprudence and a reasonable treatment of fetal homicide. See discussion infra Part III.
55. Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507A.010 (2)(a)-(b) (2004).
56. Id.
57. § 507A.010(3).
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broader than necessary to comply with the Supreme Court's abortion
jurisprudence.5 8 In fact, the exception appears to compromise the government's
interests in potential life and maternal health as set out in Roe and Casey. 9
Under Kentucky's new statutory framework, mothers are immune from
punishment for killing pre-viable unborn children through self-abuse, drug use,
or recklessness, so long as the child never reaches viability.60 To the extent that
58. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (stating that women have a constitutionally
protected right to terminate pregnancy only up to the point of viability). The cause of action for
most fetal homicides is a criminal assault on, or negligent injury of, a pregnant woman that
causes a miscarriage. The exception for the mothers' behavior essentially allows the mother to
induce an abortion by inflicting upon herself the same type of injury that is prohibited when
inflicted by a third party. Because there are no other (currently valid) statutes that punish the
killing of unborn children before viability, this exception appears to encourage a step backward
to the days of the proverbial back-alley abortion. See generally Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 507A
(2004) (providing punishment for third parties who kill unborn children during any stage of
development); Commonwealth v. Morris, 142 S.W.3d 654 (Ky. 2004) (stating that the killing of
a viable unborn child is homicide irrespective of who commits the act).
59. Compare Roe, 410 U.S. at 163 (holding that the state has an "important and legitimate
interest in potential life" after the point of viability), with Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505
U.S. 833, 846 (1992) (modifying Roe by holding that the state has an interest in potential life
even before viability and that the state has an additional interest in the health of the mother
during all stages of pregnancy). Before viability, "the State's interests are not strong enough to
support a prohibition of abortion or the imposition of a substantial obstacle to the woman's
effective right to elect the procedure." Id. After viability, the state may regulate abortion if it
provides "exceptions for pregnancies which endanger the woman's life or health." Id. In
addition, "the State has legitimate interests from the outset of the pregnancy in protecting the
health of the woman and the life of the fetus that may become a child." Id.
60. See generally Margaret P. Spencer, Prosecutorial Immunity: The Response to Prenatal
Drug Use, 25 CONN. L. REv. 393 (1993). Prenatal drug use is a serious problem. "[B]etween
350,000 and 739,200 infants are born each year exposed to drugs in utero." Mcguire Linden,
Drug Addiction During Pregnancy: A Call for Increased Social Responsibility, 4 AM. U. J.
GENDER & L. 105, 107 (1995). Scientists have shown that prenatal exposure to drugs and
alcohol can cause various injuries to the unborn child, including an increased chance of fetal
stroke and spontaneous abortion, increased infant mortality, lower birth weights, and fetal
alcohol syndrome. Id. at 107-08. However, attempts to protect unborn children often face
opposition by those hoping to preserve the Supreme Court's denial of fetal personhood. Lynn
M. Paltrow, Pregnant Drug Users, Feta Persons, and the Threat to Roe v. Wade, 62 ALB. L.
REv. 999 (1999). For a discussion of tort issues involved with maternal drug use, see Thomas
M. Fleming, Right of Child to Action Against Mother For Infliction of Prenatal Injuries, 78
A.L.R.4th 1082 (2005) (stating that some jurisdictions allow tort recovery to children for
injuries caused by maternal drug use during pregnancy). Opposition to policies of tort liability
for mothers is similar to the opposition to fetal homicide statutes and is another indicator of the
tension between federal abortion law and the public's desire to protect unborn children.
The imposition of tort liability on mothers for causing their children prenatal
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the exception allows a mother to engage in behavior that is dangerous to her
own health or that damages the State's interest in potential life, a court could
find the exception unconstitutional under Casey.61
The next four sections of the statute set out the elements for the various
degrees of fetal homicide.62 The requirements for first through third degree
fetal homicide are analogous to the requirements for murder and first and
second degree manslaughter under the standard homicide statute.63 The fetal
homicide statute also provides for fourth degree fetal homicide, with mere
recklessness as the only required mental element.64 In addition, although first
degree fetal homicide carries a capital status similar to first degree murder, the
statute includes a prohibition on the death sentence.65
Although the statute is inconsistent in its application of personhood
principles and inconsistent in its treatment of fetal homicides (depending on
who does the killing), it does succeed in providing a general increase in
protection for unborn children.66 In addition, despite the United States
Supreme Court's denial ofpersonhood to unborn children and the statute's own
failure to define unborn children as persons, the statute does show practical
support for the idea of fetal personhood.6 7 The legislature may have avoided
injury has been endorsed by some commentators as a means of promoting fetal
health by discouraging maternal conduct detrimental thereto. Other
commentators, however, have criticized such measures as impractical and
unacceptable intrusions into a woman's rights to privacy, autonomy, and bodily
integrity in procreational matters, as recognized in Roe v Wade and other cases.
Thomas M. Fleming, Right of Child to Action Against Mother For Infliction of Prenatal
Injuries, 78 A.L.R.4th 1082 (2005). See also Smith, supra note 54.
61. The broad exception for maternal behavior effectively prohibits regulation of self-
induced abortion-the proverbial back-alley abortion. See Brian W. Clowes, The Role of
Maternal Deaths in the Abortion Debate, 13 ST. Louis U. PUB. L. REv. 327, 377 (1993)
(describing the dangers of "self-help" abortions). The state's interest in potential life may be
protected by limitations on abortion only after viability. Although Casey recognized the state's
interest in potential life during all stages of pregnancy, the mother's right to abortion cannot be
unduly burdened before viability. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
62. Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 507A.020-507A.050 (2004).
63. Compare KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507A (2004), with KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 507 (1984).
64. Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507A.050 (2004).
65. Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507A.020(2) (2004); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 507A.060 (2004)
(prohibiting the death penalty for first degree fetal homicide).
66. See discussion infra Part III.
67. On its face, the statute appears to protect maternal choices about procreation more than
unborn life. For example, under the fetal homicide statute, if Morris had killed a pregnant
woman on her way to an abortion clinic rather than the hospital, he could have been charged
with fetal homicide for the death of her unborn child even though the woman had planned to
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constitutional conflict by explicitly refusing to punish acts of the mother, but
the law's designation as a "homicide statute" implicitly acknowledges the
personhood of the unborn child.68 Although the Supreme Court has denied the
existence of such personhood, the enactment of Kentucky's fetal homicide
statute demonstrates that a state government can still acknowledge the inherent
value of unborn life.69 Because the law does have a large normative impact on
society, the establishment of sanctions for the killing of unborn children will
help to promote a recognition of the inherent value of the fetus even if the
statute is not explicitly based on a constitutional right to life.
III. THE EFFECTS OF ROE V. WADE ON KENTUCKY'S FETAL
HOMICIDE JURISPRUDENCE
The combination of the Kentucky Supreme Court's decision in Morris and
the General Assembly's adoption of the new fetal homicide statute illustrate the
tension between federal abortion jurisprudence and the desire of some states to
provide consistent and effective punishment for the homicide of unborn
children. A survey of other jurisdictions confirms that Kentucky's actions are
consistent with a nationwide trend toward punishment for fetal homicide.7°
terminate the pregnancy. For an explanation of the personhood implications of fetal homicide
statutes see Smith, supra note 54, at 1879-80 ("State legislatures that have focused on the
pregnant woman as victim generally have met with less opposition from pro-choice activists,
and also have met with support from groups concerned about domestic violence.").
68. See infra note 80.
69. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 860 (1992). By holding that
"viability marks the earliest point at which the State's interest in fetal life is
constitutionally adequate to justify a legislative ban on nontherapeutic abortions," the
Court failed to acknowledge a life-interest on the part of the unborn child. Id.
70. For a state by state overview of fetal homicide protection, see National Right to Life
Committee, State Unborn Victim Laws, Oct. 5, 2005,
http://www.nrlc.org/UnbomVictims/Statehomicidelaws092302.html (last visited Dec. 18,
2006) [hereinafter NRLC]. Thirty two states have some kind of fetal homicide protection for
unbon children. Of those states, twenty recognize unborn victims at any point after conception.
Id. Twelve states provide partial protection, beginning at some point after conception. Id. Of
those twelve states, five recognize unborn victims after viability. Id. Another five states
recognize unborn victims after "quickening." Id. "Quickening" is "the first recognizable
movement of the fetus in utero, appearing usually from the 16th to the 18th week of pregnancy."
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 132 (1973). Finally, two states recognize unborn victims only if
the injury occurs after a certain time in pregnancy, seven weeks in one state and twelve weeks in
another state. NRLC. For additional information on the states' differing approaches to fetal
homicide, see Smith, supra note 54; Hilary A. Converse, Note, The Fetal Homicide Fallacy: A
Comparison of California's Inconsistent Statutes to Other States, 25 T. JEFFERSON L. REv. 451
(2003); Michael Holzapfel, Comment, The Right to Live, the Right to Choose, and the Unborn
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However, the Supreme Court's abortion jurisprudence has hindered these
efforts.
Although the Supreme Court created its abortion jurisprudence while
addressing the maternal right to privacy, its doctrines have had far-reaching
effects on other areas involving the status of the unborn, such as the ability of
states to apply homicide statutes to the killing of unborn children.71 By stating
that personhood does not attach until birth, Roe significantly reduced the
protection available to unborn children through conventional state homicide
statutes.72 For example, in Morris the Kentucky Supreme Court indicated that
it might have considered extending homicide protection from conception
onward if the Supreme Court's abortion jurisprudence had not prevented it
from doing so. 73 Unfortunately, the Supreme Court's rejection of unborn
personhood in Roe and its progeny has also stifled state efforts to provide
logical and effective punishment for the homicide of unborn children through
alternative methods such as Kentucky's fetal homicide statute.74 For example,
the prohibition on undue burdens to abortion access before viability has
foreclosed official state recognition of unborn personhood and has crippled
attempts to develop a coherent system of fetal homicide jurisprudence.75
Although recognition of the importance of fetal life appears to have
motivated the drafters of Kentucky's fetal homicide statute, the Supreme
Victims of Violence Act, 18 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POLY 431 (2002). The number of states
that punish fetal homicide before viability is evidence of a general recognition of unborn
personhood that exceeds what the Supreme Court has allowed. Sandford H. Kadish,
Methodology and Criteria in Due Process Adjudication-A Survey and Criticism, 66 YALE L.J.
319, 327-28 (1957). Decision-making about Due Process issues such as the maternal right to
privacy are informed from two sources, judgments of state courts and acts of state legislatures.
Id. The Supreme Court should not be so much "creating its own policy determinations as it is
interpreting and reading determinations that have already been made... [t]he most significant
kind of such objective data has consisted of the moral judgments already made on the point at
issue.... ." Id. When such a large portion of the nation disagrees with the Supreme Court's
precedent, the time has come for it to reevaluate its jurisprudence. For a discussion of the
federal government's response to fetal homicide, the Unborn Victims of Violence Act of 1999,
see W. Derek Malcom, The Unborn Victims of Violence Act: Addressing Moral Intuition and
the Right to Choose, 1 TENN. J. L. & POLY 277,290 (2005); Colleen Jolicoeur-Wonnacott, The
Unborn Victims of Violence Act: Friend or Foe to the Unborn, 17 T.M. COOLEY L. REv. 563
(2000).
71. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
72. See id. at 158.
73. Commonwealth v. Morris, 142 S.W.3d 654, 661 (Ky. 2004).
74. See supra Part III.
75. See supra note 62; Jackson v. Commonwealth, 96 S.W.2d 1014 (Ky. Ct. App. 1936);
Hollis v. Commonwealth, 652 S.W.2d 61 (Ky. 1983).
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Court's denial of fetal personhood forced the General Assembly to adopt at
least four limitations. First, Roe's denial of unborn personhood prevented the
statute from accurately representing its designation as a homicide statute.76 The
word "homicide" is universally known to mean "the killing of one person by
another., 77 Therefore, the heading of the fetal homicide statute implies that
unborn children are persons. However, at least one federal court has already
used Roe's denial of unborn personhood to strike down a Kentucky statute
which attempted to acknowledge the personhood of unborn children.78 The
General Assembly avoided direct conflict with Roe by drafting the fetal
homicide statute to address a newly-created class of "unborn children" rather
than "human beings., 79 In a federal abortion scheme that prohibits unborn
personhood, the implication of a "homicide statute" for unborn children is
oxymoronic. 80  However, the legislature's intentional combination of the
supposedly contradicting concepts of homicide and unborn children indicates
that it was trying to provide as much protection for unborn children as possible
despite the limitations imposed by the Supreme Court.8'
Second, when the fetal homicide statute established that unborn children had
a life-interest in relation to third parties but not in relation to their mothers, the
statute created a new kind of legal entity, the status of which is not completely
clear. An unborn child, as described by the statute, is essentially a quasi-person
and is simultaneously both a person and not a person. Relative to third
76. See KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 507A (2004).
77. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 751 (8th ed. 2004) (defining "homicide" as "[t]he killing
of one person by another.").
78. See Eubanks v. Brown, 604 F. Supp. 141 (W.D. Ky. 1984).
79. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507A.010(1)(c) (2004).
80. Homicide is the unlawful killing of a person, and according to the Supreme Court, a
fetus is not a person. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 158 (1973).
81. See Eubanks, 604 F. Supp. at 144; Roe, 410 U.S. at 158 (prohibiting the recognition of
unborn children as "person[s]"). The legislature's recognition of unborn personhood is also
evident in its requirement of intent for fetal homicide in the first degree. KY. REv. STAT. ANN. §
507A.020(1)(a) (2004). The statute states that a defendant has the requisite mental state for fetal
homicide when inter alia, he operates a motor vehicle "under circumstances manifesting an
extreme indifference to human life." Id. According to traditional theories of criminal law,
different kinds of malice can be transferred. Laura Dietz, et al., 21 AM. JUR. 2D CRIMtNAL LAW
§ 135 (2006). Therefore, an "extreme indifference to human life" would not provide the requisite
intent for a conviction of fetal homicide unless fetal homicide involved the loss of "human life."
82. See Amanda K. Bruchs, Note, Clash of Competing Interests: Can the Unborn Victims of
Violence Act and Over Thirty Years of Settled Abortion Law Co-Exist Peacefully?, 55
SYRACUSE L. REv. 133, 155 (2004) (asserting that "[s]tates should be free to define fetuses as
legal persons from conception, as long as they are not considered constitutional persons in a way
that would infringe on women's rights." (quoting Jeffrey Rosen, A Viable Solution, Legal Aff.,
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parties, the fetal homicide statute regards unborn children as possessing the
same right to life as traditional persons. 83 However, relative to their mothers,
the quasi-persons have no life-interest whatsoever.
84
Third, although the statute forbids imposition of the death sentence for fetal
homicide, it nevertheless defines "fetal homicide in the first degree" as a capital
offense. Capital crimes, such as first degree murder, are generally those for
which the State could impose the death penalty. According to the fetal
homicide statute, the State may not punish a mother who kills her unborn child
but may punish a third party who commits the same offense. Because the fetal
homicide statute does not punish the killing of an unborn child by the child's
mother, the statute does not actually protect the child's life. Rather, it merely
protects the mother's choice as to whether she wants to carry the child to ten. 85
If this is true, then the crime defined by the fetal homicide statute cannot
constitute a capital offense.86 The General Assembly's use of the capital
designation in spite of these inconsistencies is yet more proof of a desire to
Sept./Oct. 2003, at 21-22)). Some might point out that not all "legal persons" are fully-
protected "constitutional persons." Id. To do so would be a mischaracterization of the fetal
homicide situation. Entities such as corporations cannot claim the full bundle of rights
possessed by a true "person." Carl J. Mayer, Personalizing the Impersonal: Corporations and
the Bill of Rights, 41 HASTINGs L. J. 577, 643-45 (1990).
83. See supra note 78. The legislature's recognition of a life-interest is evinced by the use
of the term "homicide."
84. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507A.010(3) (2004).
85. Smith, supra note 54, at 1870. Lawmakers can choose whether to design a fetal
homicide statute to protect the mother or the child. "Either the fetus or the pregnant woman can
be considered the victim of a crime that results in fetal death or injury." Id. See also W. Derek
Malcom, The Unborn Victims of Violence Act: Addressing Moral Intuition and the Right to
Choose, 1 TENN. J. L. & POL'Y 277, 290 (2004).
86. See Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 507A.060 (2004). Fetal homicide in the first degree is a
capital offense. However, "[t]he death of an unborn child shall not result in the imposition of a
sentence of death, either as a result of the violation of [the fetal homicide statute] or as a result
of the aggravation of another capital offense .... " Id. Although the statute prohibits the death
penalty for fetal homicides, the legislature's use of the term "capital offense" indicates that the
punishment for a conviction should nonetheless be severe. Although "capital" crimes are
usually those punishable by death, there can be other consequences that attach to a "capital"
conviction. See Laura Dietz, et. al., 21 AM. JUR. 2d CRIMINAL LAw § 25 (2004). In general,
capital offenses are the type of crime for which the death penalty is appropriate. Id. Because
the Kentucky fetal homicide statute does not operate as a true homicide statute, it does not
address the type of crime for which courts often authorize the use of the penalty. See Bicka A.
Barlow, Comment, Severe Penalties for the Destruction of"Potential Life"-Cruel and Unusual
Punishment?, 29 U.S.F. L. REv. 463-64 (1995) (claiming that punishment for the killing of an
early term unborn child is cruel and unusual punishment because the child had a large chance of
dying anyway).
HeinOnline -- 1 Liberty U. L. Rev. 189 2006
LIBERTY UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW
recognize the value of unborn life and of the difficulty of doing so in light of
the Supreme Court's denial of fetal personhood.
Finally, the statute suffers from two significant equal protection problems.
First, the statute does not provide equal consequences for different killers of
unborn children. The Supreme Court has stated that "[w]hen the law lays an
unequal hand on those who have committed intrinsically the same quality of
offense and [punishes] one and not the other, it has made as invidious a
discrimination as if it had selected a particular race or nationality for oppressive
treatment. 88 Therefore, equal protection is offended when a third party who
commits fetal homicide is treated more harshly than a mother who kills her
unborn child herself.89 Additionally, if one views the fetal homicide statute as a
source of protection for unborn children, a second equal protection problem
becomes evident. A fundamental, though unstated assumption of Kentucky's
fetal homicide jurisprudence is that an unborn child must have some form of
life-interest. 90 The law is inconsistent when it grants differing levels of
protection to different unborn children based solely upon the identity of the
person who takes their life. Thus, when a statute treats two similarly-situated
unborn children differently based on factors outside of their control, it has again
offended equal protection.9'
IV. CONCLUSION
The recent developments in the Commonwealth of Kentucky demonstrate
the inconsistencies that are an inevitable result of the Supreme Court's
personhood jurisprudence. In general, the Supreme Court's overbroad rejection
of unborn personhood in Roe v. Wade has prevented courts from interpreting
existing homicide statutes to include protection for unborn children and has had
a stifling effect on legislatures that wish to protect unborn children through
meaningful and consistent fetal homicide statutes.92
Both the Morris case and the enactment of Kentucky's fetal homicide statute
illustrate important issues about the nature and value of unborn life in relation
87. See Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 507A.010(2)-(3) (2004). This argument assumes that the
legislature intended the statute to punish the destruction of unborn life rather than the mother's
right to order her procreation.
88. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (citing Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S.
356 (1886)).
89. See supra note 60. Most people would agree that mothers have a higher duty to protect
their unborn children than third parties have.
90. See discussion supra Part III.
91. Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 507A.010 (2004).
92. See discussion supra Part III.
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to the nation's current abortion policies. The recent actions of the Kentucky
courts and legislature indicate a belief that the law should give unborn children
an amount of homicide protection similar to that possessed by other human
beings and that this protection should attach from the earliest stages of
development.93
In the Supreme Court's current framework of fetal non-personhood, states
wishing to protect unborn children face significant but needless obstacles.
However, the growing body of state and federal law addressing the issue of
fetal homicide and the inconsistencies caused therein by the denial of unborn
personhood, have substantially challenged the rationale of the Supreme Court's
abortion jurisprudence. 94 The tension between federal abortion law and the
desire for effective fetal homicide protection will not be resolved until the
Supreme Court acknowledges that unborn children have an inherent value apart
from any interest of their mothers or of the state. Only with the opportunity to
work from that presupposition can judges and lawmakers develop consistent
and effective fetal homicide jurisprudence.
93. Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 311.710(5) (2005). The legislature stated its desire to reinstate
its pre-Roe abortion regulations.
It is the present intention of the [legislature] to protect the valid and compelling
interests of the Commonwealth and its inhabitants without unduly burdening a
woman's constitutional privacy rights as delineated by the courts. If, however, the
United States Constitution is amended or relevant judicial decisions are reversed
or modified, the declared policy of this Commonwealth to recognize and to protect
the lives of all human beings regardless of their degree of biological development
shall be fully restored.
Id.
94. See supra note 70.
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